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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
 This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
in which appellant alleged that he was denied opportunities for 
promotion in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.  Appellees countered that the decisions to promote 
persons other than appellant were made on the merits.  
Subsequently appellees presented the additional contention that, 
in any event, they were, as a matter of law, required by 51 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7104(b)  a section of Pennsylvania's 
Veterans' Preference Act of August 1, 1975  to promote eligible 
veterans ahead of appellant, a non-veteran.  On the latter ground 
appellees moved for summary judgment.  The district court granted 
summary judgment.  We reverse and remand. 
 
 
 I 
  
 The appellant in this action is William Markel, a 
police officer employed by the Municipality of Penn Hills 
[hereinafter "Penn Hills"].  The appellees are Harry McIndoe and 
Penn Hills.  Mr. McIndoe has been municipal manager of Penn Hills 
during all times relevant to this litigation.  As municipal 
manager, he has authority over the promotions of Penn Hills 
police officers. 
 On November 4, 1986, McIndoe was arrested on a charge 
of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol.  Markel participated in the arrest and testified against 
McIndoe at a preliminary hearing held on January 27, 1987.  
Markel again testified against McIndoe at a related appellate 
hearing held on March 30, 1988.  Following these proceedings, 
McIndoe entered and successfully completed a rehabilitation 
program. 
 Some years later  in November 1991  Markel 
participated in a civil service examination, the purpose of which 
was to determine eligible candidates for promotion to the rank of 
sergeant in the Penn Hills Police Department.  According to the 
Sergeant Candidates Eligibility List posted on December 9, 1991, 
Markel ranked second out of twenty-one candidates for promotion.  
On December 19, 1991, the person ranked third on the elibility 
list was promoted to sergeant.  On January 17, 1992, the person 
ranked first was promoted.  On February 2, 1992, the person 
originally ranked fourth was promoted.   
  
 Markel subsequently instituted this § 1983 lawsuit, 
contending that he had been passed over for promotion to sergeant 
in retaliation for his activities relating to McIndoe's arrest 
and court hearings.  Such retaliation, he claimed, constituted a 
violation of his constitutional rights under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.1  Denying Markel's allegations, appellees 
contended that the decisions to promote police officers other 
than Markel had all been made on the merits. 
 At some point after the completion of discovery, 
appellees learned of this court's decision in Carter v. City of 
Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1993)  and, evidently, 
Carter led appellees to think about the Veterans' Preference Act 
and, in particular, the provision codified at 51 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 7104(b). Section 7104(b) reads as follows: 
 Whenever any soldier [i.e. veteran] possesses 
the requisite qualifications, and his name 
appears on any eligible or promotional list, 
certified or furnished as the result of any 
such civil service examination, the 
appointing or promoting power in making an 
appointment or promotion to a public position 
shall give preference to such soldier, 
notwithstanding, that his name does not stand 
highest on the eligible or promotional list. 
 
                     
1
.  Officer Markel also contended that he was similarly denied 
transfers to other, non-civil service, positions. 
  
51 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7104(b) (1976).2  After reviewing the 
lists of those police officers certified as eligible for 
promotion to sergeant, appellees moved for summary judgment.  
Their argument  which the magistrate judge found persuasive  
was that, although § 7104(b) concededly played no actual role in 
appellees' decisions relating to Markel, § 7104(b) would in any 
event have prohibited appellees from promoting Markel ahead of 
any eligible veterans.  According to the findings of the 
magistrate judge, fourteen of the twenty-one persons on the 
December 9, 1991 eligibility list were veterans, including each 
of the persons promoted to sergeant.  In a brief order, the 
district judge adopted the report and recommendation of the 
magistrate judge. 
 On appeal, Markel argues that it was error to grant 
summary judgment.  Appellant's first and second arguments concern 
the interpretation and validity of § 7104(b).  Specifically, 
appellant contends that: (1) § 7104(b), properly read, does not 
mandate the promotion of a veteran on a civil service eligibility 
list ahead of more qualified non-veterans; and (2) that the 
promotional preference contemplated by § 7104(b), if it does so 
mandate, contravenes the Pennsylvania Constitution and also the 
federal Constitution.  Alternatively, appellant contends that 
                     
2
.  The provision was originally enacted as part of section 4 of 
the Pennsylvania Veterans' Preference Act of 1945, 51 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. § 492.4.  That section was reenacted in 1975 as part of the 
Veterans' Preference Act (Chapter 71 of the Military Code) of 
August 1, 1975, which took effect January 1, 1976. 
  
since § 7104(b) was not in fact an ingredient of appellees' 
decisions to promote other officers in preference to appellant, 
§ 7104(b) is irrelevant to the question whether appellees 
trespassed on appellant's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights; 
in appellant's view, § 7104(b) either has no proper role in this 
case or should, at most, be considered only with respect to 
remedy.3  We will first turn to appellant's argument regarding 
the interpretation of § 7104(b).   
 
 
 II  
 Section 7104(b)  which applies to both appointments 
and promotions  provides that the appointing or promoting 
authority "shall give preference" to any veteran whose name is on 
the eligible or promotional list "notwithstanding, that his name 
does not stand highest on the eligible or promotional list."  
Appellant contends that the magistrate judge  whose opinion was 
adopted by the district court  erred in construing the statute, 
pursuant to Pennsylvania case law, "as requiring the promoting 
power to appoint a veteran over a non-veteran."  According to 
appellant's intepretation of § 7104(b), a non-veteran may be 
                     
3
.  Appellant also contends that, even if § 7104(b) precludes 
relief on his claim that he was wrongfully denied promotions to 
sergeant, he has also presented claims of wrongful denial of 
transfers to other, non-civil service, positions  claims which, 
appellant argues, are outside the ambit of § 7104(b) and were not 
addressed by the magistrate judge and the district court. 
  
promoted over a veteran where "the non-veteran possesses superior 
individual qualifications for the promotion being sought."  
Appellant's Supp. Mem. of September 14, 1994, at 3.  But 
appellant's interpretation of § 7104(b) is without support in the 
Pennsylvania cases. 
  The courts which have previously examinined § 7104(b) 
have construed the "shall give preference" language as a mandate 
that any veteran on a civil service eligibility list is to be 
preferred over any non-veteran on the list.  Thus, in Rasmussen 
v. Borough of Aspinwall, 519 A.2d 1074 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987), 
appeal granted, 533 A.2d 94 (Pa. 1987)4  a case on which the 
magistrate judge relied  the Commonwealth Court reversed the 
Court of Common Pleas' determination that § 7104(b) did not 
require the appointment of the only veteran on the certified 
list.  As stated by the Commonwealth Court, "[w]hile [§ 7104(c)] 
permits Borough Council to select a veteran who is not among the 
three highest scoring applicants by using the word 'may,' Section 
7104(b), by use of the imperative 'shall,' commands Council to 
appoint the certified veteran if he or she is one of three on the 
certified list."  519 A.2d at 1076.  See also G. Gordon 
Brickhouse v. Spring Ford Area School Dist., 625 A.2d 711, 715 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) ("[Section 7104(b)] is to be applied in the 
same manner as the preference in Section 7104(a)  the qualified 
                     
4
.  Upon inquiry to the administrative office of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, we were informed that the appeal in Rasmussen was 
discontinued on March 9, 1988. 
  
veteran must be awarded the position, even if he or she stands 
lowest on the list."), rev'd on other grounds,  656 A.2d 483 (Pa. 
1995); Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252, 257 (M.D. Pa. 1973) 
(interpreting the identically-worded precursor to § 7104(b) in 
the appointments context) ("It is true that under Section 4 of 
the Act, if one of the three names is a veteran, he must be given 
an absolute preference . . . .").5  To be sure, each of the cases 
just cited arose in the context of appointments, not promotions; 
but the phrase "shall give preference" comprehends both 
appointments and promotions, and the Pennsylvania case law offers 
no ground for reading the same words as mandatory in one setting 
and non-mandatory in another.  Indeed, in a recent promotion case 
arising under § 7104(b), the Allegheny Court of Common Pleas 
looked to the appointments cases as controlling authority 
compelling an absolute preference for any veterans, as against 
                     
5
.  This interpretation is buttressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court's opinion in Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 3 A.2d 
710 (Pa. 1938)  a case discussed in further detail in part III 
of this opinion.  Schmid addressed, inter alia, a veterans' 
preference law requiring that "[a]mong those persons possessing 
qualifications and eligibility for appointment, preference in 
appointment shall be given to honorably discharged soldiers and 
sailors who served in the Army or Navy of the United States 
during time of war." 3 A.2d at 702 n.1 (quoting § 4407 of the 
Third Class City Law of June 23, 1931).  The Schmid Court 
interpreted the language as conferring an absolute preference:  
"The provision that those in the first four of the eligible list 
shall be preferred, appearing in the same section, must . . . be 
construed to be mandatory, with the exception that the appointing 
power need not select such veteran if it is found on a fair basis 
that he is morally or physically unfit to be employed."  Id. at 
706 (emphasis added by Schmid court). 
  
any non-veterans, on the promotional list.  City of Pittsburgh v. 
Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, No. GD94-017598 
at 14 (Ct. C.P. Allegheny County Nov. 9, 1994) ("Pennsylvania 
appellate court case law holds that § 7104(b) mandates that the 
qualified veteran be awarded the position, even if he or she 
stands lowest on the eligibility list."). 
 We see no reason to depart from this interpretation.  
We conclude that § 7104(b)  considered apart from 
constitutional objections  requires the promotion of any 
veteran on the eligilibity list over any non-veteran. 
 
 
 III 
 Having determined that § 7104(b) contemplates a 
mandatory promotional preference for veterans over non-veterans, 
we now turn to the question whether, as so construed, § 7104(b) 
offends the Pennsylvania Constitution. 
 
A. The Validity under the Pennsylvania Constitution of Veterans' 
Preference Statutes that Antedated the Present Statute 
 
 In order to put this state constitutional claim in 
doctrinal context, we begin our analysis by referring to 
decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court construing statutory 
schemes which preceded the current Veterans' Preference Act.  
 Almost sixty years ago, in Commonwealth ex rel. Graham 
v. Schmid, 3 A.2d 701 (Pa. 1938), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
  
considered constitutional challenges to two provisions of the 
Third Class City Law of June 23, 1931.  Section 4405, 53 P.S. 
§ 12198-4405  one of the two challenged provisions  directed 
that whenever any honorably discharged war veteran who was a 
candidate for appointment or promotion:  
 shall take any examination for appointment or 
promotion, his examination shall be marked or 
graded fifteen per centum perfect before the 
quality or contents of the examination shall 
be considered.  When the examination of any 
such person is completed and graded, such 
grading or percentage as the examination 
merits shall be added to the aforesaid 
fifteen per centum, and such total mark or 
grade shall represent the final grade or 
classification of such person and shall 
determine his or her order of standing on the 
eligible list. 
 
The other challenged provision  Section 4407, 53 P.S. § 12198-
4407  (1) required municipal authorities to give a preference, 
in making appointments to the jobs in question, to any honorably 
discharged war veterans who, having passed a prescribed civil 
service examination, were among the top four persons on the 
eligible list, and (2) authorized the appointing authorities to 
extend a preference to veterans with a passing grade even if they 
were not among the top four.   
 The litigation that came before the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court was triggered by the action of the City of Erie in 
appointing to the post of assistant building-inspector a non-
veteran, Joseph A. Schmid.  Schmid stood highest among the 
fifteen persons certified as achieving a passing grade of 70.0 or 
  
better on the civil service examination.  Schmid's grade was 
94.2.  James J. Leach, a veteran, was second:  his grade  with 
the aid of the fifteen percent bonus mandated by § 4405  was 
92.4.  Stephen P. Markham, also a veteran, was fourth: his grade 
 with the aid of the fifteen-percent bonus  was 83.0; without 
the bonus Markham would not have achieved a passing grade.  When 
Schmid was appointed assistant building-inspector, Leach and 
Markham instituted quo warranto proceedings in the Court of 
Common Pleas.  Losing in that court, they appealed to the state's 
highest court. 
 The questions addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court were whether, in the context of appointment to a municipal 
position, § 4405  adding fifteen-percent to a veteran's civil 
service score  and § 4407  requiring a preference for a 
veteran among the top four successful examinees, and permitting a 
preference for other veterans who had passed the examination  
offended Article III, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 
which, at that time, barred the General Assembly from "pass[ing] 
any local or special law . . . [g]ranting to any corporation, 
association, or individual any special or exclusive privilege or 
immunity . . . ."  Speaking through Chief Justice Kephart, the 
court ruled unanimously that (1) § 4407's mandatory preference 
for a veteran listed among the top four successful examinees was 
valid, but (2) § 4405's fifteen percent bonus for all veterans, 
  
including those who without the bonus did not achieve a passing 
grade, was invalid. 
 En route to reaching these conclusions, Chief Justice 
Kephart canvassed numerous cases in other jurisdictions assessing 
similar statutes: 
    The underlying principle in all cases is 
that to sustain any preference the veteran 
must possess the minimum qualifications to 
perform the duties involved. . . . The theory 
on which the cases are decided is that, while 
it may be perfectly lawful to prefer 
veterans, there must be some reasonable 
relation between the basis of preference and 
the object to be obtained, the preference of 
veterans for the proper performance of public 
duties. . . . 
 
    As a basis for appointment it is not 
unreasonable to select war veterans from 
candidates for office and to give them a 
certain credit in recognition of the 
discipline, experience and service 
represented by their military activity.  No 
one should deny that these advantages are 
conducive to the better performance of public 
duties, where discipline, loyalty, and public 
spirit are likewise essential.  The fact that 
veterans either through voluntary enlistment 
or conscription have been to wars for the 
preservation of their country should be given 
some consideration.  It is the greatest 
service a citizen can perform, and it comes 
with ill grace for those of us not in such 
wars to deny them just consideration.  Where 
the preferences reasonably and fairly 
appraise these advantages, there can be no 
question of illegal classification and 
arbitrary privilege.  But, on the other hand, 
where war service is appraised, in the 
allotment of public positions, beyond its 
value, and the preference goes beyond the 
scope of the actual advantages gained in such 
service, the classification becomes void and 
  
the privilege is held unreasonable and 
arbitrary. 
 
3 A.2d at 704.  From these premises, illuminated by extensive 
reference to the case law in other states, it followed that: 
    There can be no objection to the provision 
of section 4407 which permits a preference of 
any veteran on the eligible list.  The 
provision that those in the first four of the 
eligible list shall be preferred, appearing 
in the same section, must, however, be 
construed to be mandatory, with the exception 
that the appointing power need not select 
such veteran if it is found on a fair basis 
that he is morally or physically unfit to be 
employed.  Thus construed it is 
constitutional under all the cases which have 
been cited.  In none of those was a mandatory 
preference for veterans who had passed the 
examination held unconstitutional. 
 
    But statutes completely exempting veterans 
from taking the customary examinations for 
civil service positions have been ordinarily 
held unconstitutional since they do not 
require the appointees be fit for the 
position. . . . 
 
 . . . . 
 
    It therefore clearly appears that the 
decisions of other states condemn the 
provision of section 4405 giving fifteen 
percent credit in advance to veterans as 
unconstitutional.  It is not distinguishable 
from a statute which would allow a fifteen 
percent lower passing grade for veterans.  It 
gives undue weight to the military and public 
experience of the veterans and in that way 
constitutes a special and exclusive 
privilege. 
 
Id. at 706-07 (emphasis in original). 
 
  
 Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the 
trial court; since § 4407 was valid, and Leach was found to rank 
among the top four successful examinees even without the flawed 
fifteen-percent bonus, the trial court on remand was directed to 
enter judgment ordering the removal of Schmid and also ordering 
the appointment of Leach, unless Leach was found to be physically 
or morally unfit.   
 A year after Schmid, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in 
Carney v. Lowe, 9 A.2d 418 (Pa. 1939), addressed another 
controversy arising in Erie under the Third Class City Law.  This 
time the issue was the propriety of including, on the list of 
persons certified as eligible for appointment, fifteen veterans, 
all of whom (1) had passed the required civil service examination 
but (2) were older (they ranged in age from thirty-seven to 
forty-four) than the age ceiling for initial appointment as a 
police officer  namely, the age of thirty-five  prescribed by 
the civil service board.  The inclusion of the veterans was 
deemed to be justified (or perhaps mandated) by the final 
sentence of § 4407:  "Such [preferential] appointment of 
soldiers, sailors and marines may be made without regard to any 
age limitations now provided for by law or the rules and 
regulations of any board or commission having in charge civil 
service regulations in any county, city or borough." 
 On application of fifteen non-veterans who had passed 
the civil service examination, the Court of Common Pleas ordered 
  
that the names of the fifteen veterans be removed from the 
eligible list.  In a unanimous ruling the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court affirmed.  Speaking through Justice Horace Stern, the court 
found the issue to be controlled by the previous year's ruling in 
Schmid.  Applying Schmid, the Court said: 
 To require that an applicant for a position 
in the police department be below a certain 
age is the prescription of a qualification 
for eligibility.  To permit war veterans to 
be appointed even though above such maximum 
is not the mere granting to them of a 
preference if otherwise eligible but the 
setting up for them of a standard of 
eligibility different from that established 
for other applicants.  Therefore it is clear 
that the permitted waiver of the age limit 
provided by section 4407 is unconstitutional. 
 
9 A.2d at 420. 
  
 In a footnote to his opinion in Carney v. Lowe, Justice 
Stern pointed out that the legislature had, on June 27, 1939, 
passed a new statute intended, according to section 5, 51 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. § 491.5, to serve as "'the exclusive law applying to 
the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions in giving 
preference to soldiers in appointment to public position.'"  Id. 
at n.2.  Six years later, in the spring of 1945, with the end of 
World War II in sight, the legislature enacted the Veterans' 
Preference Act of May 22, 1945, which replaced the 1939 statute.  
The 1945 statute became the focus of Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer 
v. O'Neill, 83 A.2d 382 (Pa. 1951), a further examination of the 
constitutionality of veterans' preference statutes.  The 
  
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed the 
constitutionality of such statutes since O'Neill. 
 While Schmid and Carney v. Lowe dealt with initial 
appointment to public office, O'Neill dealt with promotion  the 
process at issue in the case at bar.  The focus of O'Neill was 
Section 3 of the Veterans' Preference Act of May 22, 1945, which 
provided as follows: 
   Whenever any soldier [i.e. veteran] shall 
successfully pass a civil service appointment 
or promotional examination . . . such 
soldier's examination shall be marked or 
graded an additional ten points above the 
mark or grade credited for the examination 
and the total mark . . . thus obtained . . . 
shall determine his standing on any eligible 
or promotional list, certified or furnished 
to the appointing or promoting power.  
 
 In 1949, the Fire Bureau of the City of Philadelphia 
conducted a civil service examination for promotion to the rank 
of captain.  George Braden, a non-veteran, achieved a passing 
grade of 79.59.  Among the other officers who passed the 
examination were certain veterans who, with the aid of the 
"additional ten points" called for by Section 3 of the Veterans' 
Preference Act, achieved scores of 81.47 to 88.05.  In 
consequence, the veterans were promoted to captain and Braden was 
not.  Braden then brought a quo warranto proceeding in the Court 
of Common Pleas, challenging the constitutionality of Section 3.  
Losing in the trial court, Braden appealed to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court.  That court reversed the judgment of the Court of 
  
Common Pleas and directed that the several challenged promotions 
be rescinded. 
 The opinion in O'Neill was delivered by Chief Justice 
Drew.  The core of the court's holding is contained in the 
following paragraphs: 
    At the outset it is conceded that the 
granting of a preference in the case of 
original appointments is constitutional.  
That question was decided in Commonwealth ex 
rel. Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 3 A.2d 
701, 120 A.L.R. 777.  We there laid down the 
test to be used in determining such cases, 
stating 333 Pa. at p. 573, 3 A.2d at page 
704:  ". . . there must be some reasonable 
relation between the basis of preference and 
the object to be obtained, the preference of 
veterans for the proper performance of public 
duties.  Public policy, as well as 
constitutional restrictions, prohibits an 
unrestrained preference as it does a 
preference credit based on factors not 
representative of their true value." 
 
    When we apply that test to the facts of 
this case, we can come only to the conclusion 
that, because of the difference between an 
original appointment and a promotion, the 
award of the ten percentage point preference 
to veterans in examinations for promotions is 
unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.  
In the Schmid case, Mr. Chief Justice Kephart 
pointed out that preferences to veterans in 
appointments to public office are reasonable 
because the discipline, experience and 
service represented by the veterans' military 
activity makes them more desirable applicants 
for public positions where discipline, 
loyalty and public spirit are essential, than 
those who have not served in one of our 
military organizations.  But, the former 
Chief Justice qualified the right of the 
legislature to grant such preferences when he 
added that "where war service is appraised, 
in the allotment of public positions, beyond 
  
its value, and the preference goes beyond the 
scope of the actual advantages gained in such 
service, the classification becomes void and 
the privilege is held unreasonable and 
arbitrary."  We do not doubt but that the 
military training received by veterans during 
the course of their service renders them 
superior candidates for public offices of the 
nature now under consideration.  However, we 
are convinced that the legislature, in 
authorizing the addition of ten percentage 
points to the veterans' final examination 
marks in all competitive examinations for 
higher positions that the original 
appointments, has placed far too high a value 
on the benefit to the public service of the 
military training of veterans.  In the case 
of an original appointment, the training a 
veteran has received in the armed forces 
will, no doubt, make him more amenable to the 
following of orders, the observance of 
regulations and, in other ways, tend toward 
making him a desirable employee.  But the 
advantages to the public of this training are 
not absolute and, as time passes, the 
proportional benefit accruing to the public 
from the employment in such a service of 
veterans in preference to non-veterans 
gradually diminishes as both become 
proficient in the performance of their 
duties.  In determining who is to be awarded 
a promotion, the skill of the particular 
examinees in the performance of their tasks 
is the prime consideration and compared to it 
the training gained by veterans solely as a 
result of military service becomes of very 
little importance.  To credit veteran 
examinees in examinations for successive 
promotions with the same total of gratuitous 
percentage points as in the instance of their 
original appointment to a public position is, 
therefore, a totally unjustified appraisal of 
the value of their military training and 
highly prejudicial to the public service. 
 
 . . . . 
 
  
    It follows from what has been said that 
the Veterans Preference Act, in granting the 
same preference to veterans in examinations 
for promotions as is granted in their 
original appointments to a public office is 
unreasonable and class legislation and 
therefore unconstitutional. 
 
83 A.2d at 382-84.6  
 
   
B. The Present Statute 
 The present veterans' preference statute  the statute 
of which § 7104(b) is a part  is the Veterans' Preference Act 
of August 1, 1975, which took effect on January 1, 1976.  On June 
15, 1976, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania issued Opinion No. 
76-17.  That Opinion addressed the constitutionality of the two 
provisions of the present statute which are derived from  and, 
indeed, in their effective operative language, are verbatim 
continuations of  the statutory provisions considered in Schmid 
and O'Neill.  One of the two provisions addressed by the Attorney 
General was current § 7103(a), which adds ten points to the 
examination score of a veteran who "shall successfully pass a 
civil service appointment or promotional examination."  The other 
provision addressed by the Attorney General was current 
§ 7103(b), which directs that a veteran's examination "shall be 
marked or graded 15% perfect before the quality or contents of 
                     
6
.  Justice Allen Stearne, joined by Justices Horace Stern and 
Grover Ladner, dissented; the dissenters found no difference of 
constitutional magnitude between an original appointment and a 
promotion. 
  
the examination shall be considered."  With respect to § 7103(a), 
the Attorney General characterized O'Neill's assessment of the 
virtually identical provision in the 1945 Veterans' Preference 
Act as a holding that the provision "was unreasonable and class 
legislation insofar as it attempted to grant veterans a 10 point 
preference on promotion examinations."  Opinions of the Attorney 
General of Pennsylvania, No. 76-17, at 54 (1976).  With respect 
to § 7103(b), the Attorney General characterized Schmid's 
assessment of the virtually identical provision of the 1931 Third 
Class City Law as a holding "that a credit to veterans of points 
to aid them in passing civil service examinations is 
unconstitutional," a holding "reaffirmed by the [Pennsylvania] 
Supreme Court in Carney v. Lowe."  Id. at 55.  The Attorney 
General then stated: 
    The Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 
provides "that when a court of last resort 
has construed the language used in a statute, 
the General Assembly in subsequent statutes 
on the same subject matter intends the same 
construction to be placed upon such 
language."  1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(4).  Thus, 
reenactment continues the prior law, 
including all judicial construction thereof.  
Consequently, the two provisions in question 
are still unconstitutional. 
 
Id. 
 
 Like §§ 7103(a) and (b), discussed in the Attorney 
General's 1976 Opinion, § 7104(b)  the statutory provision 
involved in the case at bar, directing the "appointing or 
promoting power" to "give preference" to a veteran whose name 
  
appears "on any eligible or promotional list . . . 
notwithstanding, that his name does not stand highest on the 
eligible or promotional list"  was drawn essentially verbatim 
from antecedent veterans' preference legislation.7  Presumably, 
the fact that the Attorney General did not mention § 7104(b) in 
his 1976 Opinion traces to the fact that § 7104(b)'s statutory 
ancestor was not discussed in Schmid, Carney v. Lowe, or O'Neill.  
In 1993, when this court, in Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 989 
F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1993), had occasion to consider § 7104(b)  
holding that Philadelphia's Civil Service Regulations were 
preempted by the state statute  we noted that "[t]he 
constitutionality of the preference of § 7104(b) or its prior 
identical provision in 51 P.S. § 492-4 is not before us, nor does 
it appear, historically, to have ever been challenged on these 
grounds before the Commonwealth's appellate courts."  Id. at 121 
n.5.8 
  The question not before the Carter court is presented 
by the case at bar.  In examining that question, we first inquire 
whether  given that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not had 
occasion to assess the constitutionality of veterans' preference 
statutes for over forty years  the constitutional framework 
                     
7
.  See note 2, supra. 
8
.  Subsequent to Carter, the constitutionality of § 7104(b), as 
applied in a promotional context, was addressed by Judge Wettick 
of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.  On the authority 
of O'Neill, Judge Wettick held that in a promotional context 
§ 7104(b) is unconstitutional.  See note 13, infra. 
  
erected by that court starting in the late 'thirties and 
continuing into the 'fifties is still in place. 
 It was in 1975 that the Attorney General of the 
Commonwealth  looking back to Schmid, decided in 1938, and to 
the two cases which followed it, Carney v. Lowe, decided in 1939, 
and O'Neill, decided in 1951  concluded that the decades-old 
trilogy stated enduring constitutional doctrine.  Is it the case 
that the lapse of almost twenty years since the Attorney General 
rendered his Opinion has undermined the authority of Schmid and 
its sequelae?   
 Just three months ago, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
in Brickhouse v. Spring-Ford Area School District, 656 A.2d 483 
(Pa. 1995) offered strong evidence that Schmid remains a 
controlling precedent.  Brickhouse presented a question as to the 
proper interpretation of § 7104(a)  a companion to § 7104(b)  
which provides a "preference" in appointments and promotions to 
non-civil service public positions for any veteran possessing 
"the requisite qualifications."9  The plaintiff in Brickhouse was 
a veteran who, notwithstanding that he held a valid Pennsylvania 
teacher's certificate, was turned down for a position teaching 
social studies in the Spring-Ford Area School District; in lieu 
of plaintiff the defendant school district hired a non-veteran.  
                     
9
.  In contrast, section 7104(b)  the provision at issue in the 
case at bar  directs that a veteran certified via a civil 
service examination as qualified for appointment or promotion 
shall be given "preference . . . notwithstanding, that his name 
does not stand highest on the eligible or promotion list." 
  
The plaintiff's position was "that to be qualified to teach in 
Pennsylvania, the only requirements are that one be of sound 
moral character, over eighteen years of age and be certified to 
teach by the Commonwealth, and that once he is qualified, he must 
be awarded the job."  Id. at 486.  The school district's position 
was "that although Brickhouse was certified to teach in 
Pennsylvania, he was not qualified to teach in this particular 
school district, where high academic performance, outstanding 
recommendations, and current references were required."  Id. at 
485.   
 In rejecting Brickhouse's claim to a statutory 
preference, the court turned for guidance to Schmid, which it 
characterized as "[t]he landmark case in the area."  Id. at 486.  
Relying upon the analysis the court had found persuasive in 
Schmid, the court in Brickhouse defined "qualified" as the 
"ability to perform the job at the level of skill and with the 
expertise demanded by the employer," id.  and not, as 
Brickhouse urged, as "eligibility to be considered for the 
position," id. at 487.  Based upon this understanding of the word 
"qualified," the court found that "there is no doubt that the 
school district's criteria for employment were rationally related 
to the job and that Brickhouse's credentials did not qualify him 
for the job."  Id. at 487-88.  The court thus used Schmid as the 
  
basis for a restrictive interpretation of the veterans' 
preference afforded by § 7104(a).10 
                     
10
.  The Brickhouse court briefly discussed the fact that the 
constitutional provision upon which Schmid had relied  former 
Article III, section 7  had been repealed.  That section 
prohibited "any local or special law . . . [g]ranting to any . . 
. individual any special or exclusive privilege or immunity."  
(Article 3, section 32, the current constitutional provision 
barring the enactment of a "local or special law in any case 
which has been or can be provided for by general law," has not 
retained the "special or exclusive privilege or immunity" 
language, but similar language is to be found in Article 1, 
section 17, which provides that "[n]o ex post facto law, nor any 
law impairing the obligation of contracts, or making irrevocable 
any grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed.")  
The Brickhouse court noted that "[i]n 1967, this [Article III, 
section 7] language was deleted from the constitution by 
amendment," and then went on to observe:  
  
 However, Schmid is also grounded on 
constitutional principles sounding in due 
process and equal protection: 
 
  [Veterans'] preferences have been 
considered by the courts under 
constitutional prohibitions against 
special privileges and unreasonable 
classification, and while the 
constitutional provisions differ 
somewhat in the various 
jurisdictions, they are similar in 
that all permit reasonable 
classifications and prohibit 
unreasonable ones and arbitrary 
privileges 
 
Brickhouse, 656 A.2d at 486 (quoting Schmid, 3 A.2d at 704) 
(emphasis added by Brickhouse court). 
     The Pennsylvania Constitution's equal protection guarantees 
are understood to reside in Article 1, section 26 and Article 3, 
section 32.  Article 1, section 26 provides: "Neither the 
Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to 
any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate 
against any person in the exercise of any civil right."  Article 
3, section 32 prohibits the General Assembly from passing any 
  
 Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has so recently 
underscored Schmid's validity  and, in particular, the 
limitations it sets forth on veterans' preferences  it seems 
probable that O'Neill, which applied the principles of Schmid to 
promotions, would also be regarded by that court as a precedent 
that offers reliable guidance.11  It will be recalled that in 
(..continued) 
"local or special law in any case which has been or can be 
provided for by general law," and specifically prohibits local or 
special laws in eight enumerated categories.  Where neither 
suspect or "sensitive" classifications nor fundamental or 
"important" rights are involved, the equal protection guarantees 
have been intepreted to require that any distinction created by 
the legislation be "'reasonable, not arbitrary' 
" and "'rest[] upon a difference having a fair and substantial 
relation to the object of the legislation.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358, 1365 (Pa. 1986) (quoting 
Snider v. Thornburgh, 436 A.2d 593, 597 (Pa. 1981)).  Similarly, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that state 
substantive due process guarantees prohibit laws which are 
"'unreasonable, unduly oppressive or patently beyond the 
necessities of the case,'" or which employ means without a "'real 
and substantial relation to the objects sought to be attained.'"  
Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 436 A.2d 147, 
156 (Pa. 1981) (quoting Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 
637 (Pa. 1954)), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 940 (1982).  (The 
source of the state substantive due process guarantees, while 
frequently not identified in the caselaw, appears to be Article 
1, section 1.  See Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y v. Foster, 608 A.2d 
633, 637 (Pa. Commw. 1992)).  Thus, the applicable legal standard 
set forth by current state equal protection and due process law 
is, like the standard applied in Schmid, one based on 
"reasonableness." 
11
.   In predicting how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is likely 
to resolve a question of Pennsylvania law, it is our practice to 
consider "relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, 
considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data 
tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the state 
would decide the issue at hand."  McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical 
Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
976 (1980).  We find that the Brickhouse court's heavy reliance 
on Schmid, its consideration of the relevant constitutional 
  
O'Neill the court considered the constitutionality of awarding a 
(..continued) 
principles underlying Schmid, and, in particular, its willingness 
to use Schmid as a springboard for a restrictive interpretation 
of the term "requisite qualifications" in § 7104(a), offer 
considerable evidence of continued allegiance to the limitations 
placed on veterans' preference laws in Schmid and O'Neill  
limitations which the Pennsylvania Attorney General, in 1976, 
concluded were still in effect. 
     It is, of course, possible that if the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court were today to be examining veterans' preference statutes 
for the first time it would adopt a standard of "reasonableness" 
less demanding than that applied in Schmid and reaffirmed in 
O'Neill.  Two federal cases rejecting equal protection challenges 
to state preferential promotions statutes would, arguably, offer 
support for such a relaxed standard.  Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. 
Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 976 (1973); Rios 
v. Dillman, 499 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1974).  On the other hand, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has shown a willingness to "carefully 
scrutinize the validity" of laws implicating Article 3, section 
32's specific prohibition of "any local or special law . . . 
[r]egulating labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing."  Kroger Co. 
v. O'Hara Township, 392 A.2d 266, 274 (Pa. 1978).  In Kroger, the 
court noted that "[w]hile there may be a correspondence in 
meaning and purpose between [the federal and state equal 
protection guarantees], the language of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution is substantially different from the federal 
constitution.  We are not free to treat that language as though 
it were not there."  Id.  After deriving from Article 3, section 
32 a "duty to carefully examine any law regulating trade," id., 
the court went on to hold that Pennsylvania's scheme of Sunday 
trading laws was unconstitutional  despite United States 
Supreme Court precedent suggesting a more permissive approach.  
Since the veterans' preference statute is a law "regulating 
labor," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could, in consonance with 
Kroger, conclude that a similar, more searching, examination 
should be applied to statutes providing veterans' promotional 
preferences. 
     However, speculation about how the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court might proceed were it addressing veterans' preference 
statutes for the first time need not detain us.  The court has, 
in fact, had occasion to consider statutes of this sort in 
several cases over a space of nearly sixty years.  Brickhouse 
shows that the current court continues to look for guidance to 
the Schmid-O'Neill jurisprudence.  We see no reason to anticipate 
that the court will jettison that jurisprudence.  
  
ten-point bonus to veterans who had passed a promotional 
examination for the position of fire captain.  The court held 
that such a bonus  placing the veterans higher on the certified 
list than the non-veteran plaintiff  would have been 
permissible at the initial appointment stage but was not 
constitutionally supportable at the promotional stage:  "the 
advantages to the public of this [military] training are not 
absolute and, as time passes, the proportional benefit accruing 
to the public from the employment . . . of veterans in preference 
to non-veterans gradually diminishes as both become proficient in 
the performance of their duties" and "[i]n determining who is to 
be awarded a promotion, the skill of the particular examinees in 
the performance of their tasks is the prime consideration and 
compared to it the training gained by veterans solely as a result 
of military service becomes of very little importance."  83 A.2d 
at 383. 
 In O'Neill, the veterans' preference held to be 
unconstitutional was contingent in that a veteran on the 
certified list had to score within ten points of a competitor 
non-veteran to lay claim to the promotion.  By contrast, 
§ 7104(b) confers upon every veteran on the certified list a 
promotional "preference . . . notwithstanding, that the veteran's 
name does not stand highest on the . . . list."12  We conclude 
                     
12
.  In Carter we noted that, although the plaintiff 
"interchangeably posit[ed] a secured property right in both a 
'preference in promotion' and a 'promotion' . . . [t]he 
Pennsylvania statute clearly bequeaths only the lesser right  
  
that in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's willingness to 
invalidate the more limited preference scheme in O'Neill, that 
court would hold § 7104(b)'s absolute promotional preference to 
be unconstitutional as "'unreasonable' and 'class legislation.'"  
O'Neill, 83 A.2d at 384.13 
 In sum, we conclude that, if the issue were to come 
before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that court would hold 
that, in the context of promotions, the veterans' preference 
contemplated by § 7104(b) is incompatible with the Pennsylvania 
(..continued) 
that of a preference in promotion  and not an unequivocal right 
to a promotion to a sergeant's position because of his veteran's 
status."  989 F.2d at 119 n.4.  The "lesser right"  not a right 
to require that a promotional vacancy be filled but a right to 
"preference" if the vacancy is filled  is, of course, 
sufficient to defeat the claim of any qualified non-veteran. 
13
.  The point is made succinctly in the one Pennsylvania case of 
which we are aware that has addressed the constitutionality of 
the promotional preference contemplated by § 7104(b).  In City of 
Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, 
No. GD94-017598 (Ct. C.P. Allegheny County Nov. 9, 1994), Judge 
Wettick put the matter as follows: 
 
    If a statutory provision which only awards 
ten points to veterans who have passed a 
promotional examination violates the 
Pennsylvania constitutional provision 
prohibiting the grant of special privileges, 
a legislative provision that automatically 
moves a veteran who passed the examination to 
the top of the promotional list gives greater 
weight to military service and, thus, is a 
more egregious violation of this 
constitutional provision. 
 
City of Pittsburgh, slip op. at 14. 
  
Constitution.14  Under these circumstances, the appellees could 
not properly rely on § 7104(b) as a ground for denying appellant 
a promotion.  Thus, § 7104(b) was not a legally cognizable 
defense against appellant's § 1983 claim. 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 
 For the reasons given in part III of this opinion, the 
district court's grant of summary judgment was in error.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed and 
the case is remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
                     
14
.  Appellant also contends that "for those same reasons as set 
forth in O'Neill, the Act [§ 7104(b)] would violate the Equal 
Protection Clause and Due Process clauses [sic] of the United 
States Constitution as the Act would not be reasonably related to 
any legislative purpose."  Brief of Appellant at 20.  Appellees 
disagree, citing Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 
612 (1985).  Since we find § 7104(b), as applied to promotions, 
is inconsistent with the Pennsylvania Constitution, there is no 
need for us to address the federal constitutional question. We 
also need not consider appellant's claim that appellees' ex post 
facto invocation of § 7104(b) should either have been wholly 
disregarded or treated in a manner similar to after-acquired 
evidence of employee misconduct.  See McKennon v. Nashville 
Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995); see also Mardell v. 
Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated 
and remanded for further consideration in light of McKennon, 115 
S. Ct. 1397 (1995). 
